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NATO: THE INDISPENSABLE WESTERN ALLIANCE

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Preface

I am European, my wife is American and our sons are both European and American. I know from experience that my culture is different from the American one. Although, the European and American values, the values we teach our sons are fundamentally the same. Because Americans and Europeans have the same core beliefs, our sons, one day, will be able to live in either side of the Atlantic. It will be their choice. In order for them and many others to have that choice available, the West needs to find strategies focused on the future preservation of those values.

This paper brings different historical and political perspectives mainly from the 20th century. It also brings current examples to validate the importance of preserving the West core democratic values. The preservation of these values is fundamental, so future generations have the opportunity to live in a free world where they can make their own choices. This is why it is important to read this paper. It presents the American and European values, today's global insecurity dilemma and possible ways for the West to preserve its beliefs.

I want to extend my appreciation to Dr. Mary Hampton, my advisor, for motivating me to pursue this subject so many times discussed before. The difference in this particular discussion - that she pointed out - is that the reasons that seem to be dividing the West, more than material are ideological. That note drove my research into a different alley.

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Abstract

NATO is the indispensable Alliance to the preservation of the western values. It is a tool capable of creating a bridge between American and European interests and identities and without it, the western stability will grow weaker. The Allies are different to a certain extent, although their cultural foundations are based on the same core democratic values and beliefs. Due to their geography, history, nationalism/ethnicity, development and religion, they came to develop different external behaviors. More than values, policies are what most divide the West. Globalization, the victory over communism, a technology driven revolution in military affairs, the chance of spreading a model of society thru the internet and modern communication systems, all allowed the rise of political awareness, envy and resentment against the West. The global turmoil the world is facing is a compound of security problems. Their implications can be devastating to the West. The first two possible solutions for the preservation of the Western Values are the creation of ad hoc coalitions and a complete separation in the European and American Military. Both solutions are not legitimate, do not defend collective security, nor defend the preservation of the Western Values. A third solution indicates what the Allies need to do. A different North-Atlantic Alliance, projected for the 21st century where both Allies assume their responsibilities. Europe assumes its full political and economic responsibility and America compromises its freedom of action towards effective institutionalism, in favor of global leadership rather than global governance.

Introduction

“The world is now politically awakened to the inequality on the human condition.”¹

Globalization, technology and the spread of information allowed a worldwide political awareness. As the world social economical asymmetries became clear, the world resentment grew against the West. On September 11, 2001, people all over the world awoke to a cruel and terrible reality. Total national security and security given by natural geographic isolation both belong to the past. The possibility of striking societies with catastrophic consequences became accessible not only to preeminent world powers, but also to isolated groups, virtually separated from their state and without the moral and legal constraints of the civilized world. In the awakening of this post Cold War global turmoil, how can man preserve his freedom, his right to life or pursuit of happiness? What exactly is the world, and in particular, the Western World facing today? Will the West be able to overcome some extrinsic differences and preserve its values and beliefs as they are today, or will it have to adjust to this new reality? This paper defends that NATO is the indispensable Alliance to the preservation of the western values, since it is a tool capable of creating a bridge between American and European interests and identities and without it, the western stability will grow weaker.

The first chapter focuses on the values and beliefs that characterize Americans and Europeans. Such focus starts by describing what the West in reality means, then analyzes the American and European identities and it ends by presenting some of the differences and similarities between Americans and Europeans. The second chapter presents the security dilemma the world is facing today. It starts with a reference to the effects of the American

hegemony, it follows relating globalization, economic asymmetry and political awareness with the rise of global turmoil. It concludes explaining what exactly are the new challenges and threats to global security and what implications they have to the West. The third chapter analyzes the solution that best protects what the West represents. It starts with the definition of the criteria that will evaluate three possible solutions to the security dilemma. It then analyzes each criterion in three different alternatives the West can use to guarantee its security and preserve its values. At the end, the third chapter describes what the West needs to do in order to prepare NATO for the 21st century and guarantee the preservation of the western values.

The Western Values

1. The Concept of West

The concept of West, while cultural and political, appeared in the 19th century. It emerged from the Enlightenment ideals of political liberty and universal humanity, expressed in the French and American revolutions.² It gained consistency throughout the 20th century, during the two World Wars and the Cold War, in contrast to the ideas of what was non-West, such as Nazi Germany, authoritarian Russia, Communist Soviet Union and the Orient. More than anything else, the West emerged as a political alliance between some western powers, such as France, Great Britain, and America.³

2. The American Identity

The American identity is deep-rooted in core democratic values. The American Constitution defends that all men are created equal, that God gives them certain rights, such as Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.⁴ The Constitution further states that Government derives from the people. Governments are organized in a certain way and have certain powers and responsibilities, like the responsibility to establish safety for the people.⁵ The core values expressed in the American writings and speeches (Declaration of Independence, the United States Constitution, Gettysburg Address, the Star Spangled Banner, and the Pledge of Allegiance)⁶ are fundamental beliefs and constitutional principles that unite all Americans.⁷ These include beliefs of life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, justice, equality, diversity, truth, popular sovereignty, patriotism, and rule of law.

Since their inception, Americans developed the idea of exceptionalism alongside religious predestination. Religion and the sense of holy mission were determinant in the way America conducted domestic and foreign policies. America, the “shining city upon a hill,” free from religious or political persecution grew under the conviction that God gave her the mission to defend these values across the world and defend it from oppression and tyranny. When President Woodrow Wilson led America into the First World War against imperial Germany, he had in mind to protect democracy and save civilization.⁸ In a speech to Congress on April 2, 1917, Woodrow Wilson defended a safe world for democracy and a peace based on political liberty.⁹ Wilson defended the American involvement in the War, as a way to fulfill God given mission and save the World from tyranny.¹⁰ The war was justified by the redemptive vision of a new world order, based on American ideals and by the fact it would free Europeans from autocratic regimes. President Wilson believed God gave America the divine mission of shepherding the world into His kingdom.¹¹

The idea of exceptionalism continues to influence American Leaders whose speeches and policies often reflect it. In the beginning, it was apparently different. Americans, contrary to their European ancestors were against the idea of war. War would be a last resort to defend freedom and democracy. Some authors argued that America’s initial aversion to power politics and to the use of war was only the result of a position of weakness.¹² In his book - *Of Paradise and Power* - Robert Kagan argues that Americans simply defended international law as the best way to regulate nation’s behaviors, because they were in a position of weakness in relation to European countries like Great Britain or France. When the European position of dominance disappeared after two world wars, it also changed the American way of defending her interests in the world. Although it might seem that America changed with the collapse of the Berlin Wall

and 9/11, it did not. She only became more herself.¹³ What did change after 1989 and especially after 9/11 was not the ideology but the strategy to defend it. After WWII, the threat of communism compelled America to defend her interests well beyond the main land, into the East, Middle East, Latin America and Africa.¹⁴ Since then the American influence in the world grew even more and came to meet the Americans expectations and predestination. A predestination not only recognized by George W. Bush (“our Nation’s cause has always been larger than our Nation’s defense.”¹⁵) but also countless times before, by many other American Presidents. Thomas Jefferson predicted an “empire of liberty,” Hamilton envisioned an America “majestic, efficient, and operative of great things.”¹⁶

Today’s American way is different from the beginning of the 19th Century. Although they are still idealists since they continue to believe in the same core democratic values that appear in the American Constitution. They are no different from Woodrow Wilson when he fought the “war to end all wars.”¹⁷ They still seek to “champion aspirations for human dignity,”¹⁸ or defend the world from evil, guarantee “economic growth through free markets and free trade.”¹⁹ Yet, because history did not give America a chance of learning a different way of defending these beliefs, as it gave to Europe, American foreign policies often collide with other nations, institutions or ideologies.

3. The European Identity

With a different historical trajectory, Europeans went from defenders of power politics to defenders of institutionalism and multilateralism. Religion also had a significant influence in the European history. A good example of that were the so-called “Christian Crusades,”²⁰ the Western European military expeditions and conflicts waged internally and externally in Europe against non-Christians. These Crusades took place not only to recover Christian territory from

the Muslims in the Middle East, but also to expand the religious and political power. Europeans often resorted to weapons and war to achieve their political, religious or economical goals. For centuries, Europe was a battlefield, the place where successive emperors fought their wars. The last century in particular was a brutal and violent one. WWI devastated Germany, Russia and Austria-Hungary, three of the five most powerful states in Europe since the German unification in 1871.²¹ It also left France and Great Britain in a weak position, financially strapped, highly dependent on America, without the power and the political will to create an effective collective security through the League of Nations. On top of that, in between the Great Wars, England, France and other European countries had to fight their own colonial wars.²² England and France gave up the collective security strategy, the appeasement with Adolf Hitler did not work and Europe came to have a destructive WWII. Its outcome, together with all the brutal human and material destruction, was a retrenchment of European global influence.²³ Europe had no financial or political capacity to project sufficient force to maintain its colonies. It went from a leading position in the 19th century to a very dependent one in the 20th century. Just as Americans had done before WWI, this time, European leaders were the ones searching for a system that would prevent another major confrontation in Europe.

After WWII, in an American manner, the Europeans quested for effective multilateralism in order to develop a stronger international society, based on well-functioning international institutions.²⁴ On May 9, 1950, in Paris, the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, in order to prevent another war between France and Germany, would invite them and other European countries as well, to bring together their coal and steel production. This step was “the first concrete foundation of a European federation”²⁵ and started a system of governance

where sovereignty would be shared and where economical development and economic interdependency would mutually prevent confrontation between the European countries.²⁶

After WWII, while America initiated a path to consolidate her ideology worldwide and to fulfill her destiny - many times using war to do so – Europe moved further away from power politics and became self-absorbed in its own problems. The idea of solving problems by using the military became absurd for the traumatized European people. Europe, once powerful and belligerent became weak and skeptic of war. It became a defender of soft power, institutions and diplomacy to solve problems. It became a defender of war as a last resort, used only after international institutions, diplomacy and peaceful solutions, all failed. Ironically, Europe found itself at the point where America was in the beginning of the 20th century.

4. The Allie's Differences and Similarities

Although Europe and America essentially share the same fundamental beliefs, the ideas about promoting sustainable development, advancing human rights and of global economic growth and integration, their strategy to secure their international interests is recognizably different. These diverging strategic behaviors reveal how Americans and Europeans have different cultures. Culture can be defined as “the relatively stable set of inner values and beliefs generally held by groups of people in countries or regions and the noticeable impact those values and beliefs have on the peoples’ outward behaviors and environment.”²⁷ The major differences between Americans and Europeans are not on the values and beliefs, but on the people’s outward behaviors. Americans admire personal empowerment and individualism to control their own destiny, more so than Europeans do. Proof of that is in the European welfare system, which is based on the state and not so much on individual responsibility.²⁸ Americans believe that “dignity lies in morally redeeming work rather than in the social solidarity of a welfare state.”²⁹

Americans are more religious than Europeans are. According to the Pew Foundation, while less than a third of Germans, Italians, French and British are still considered religious, the majority of Americans consider the belief in God as a prerequisite to morality.³⁰ Because of their history, both America and Western European countries are secular. Although, while in western European countries, religion has a smaller influence in politics, in America it seems to be the opposite. Successive American Administrations use it to influence the public in support of their policies. Their actions are often justified by the sense of liberation from evil.

Americans and Europeans have different national identities. The Civil War and all the wars America fought abroad during the 20th century helped in the development of American nationalism. During the Cold War, the American national identity was shaped by anti-Communism.³¹ In relation to Europeans it is more correct to speak in supra-nationalism. Europeans moved away from the nationalism and out-of-control sovereignty responsible for WWI.³² They find it difficult to define themselves in national terms. They also find it difficult to define a European identity. Since it is difficult for Europeans to describe themselves, they often define themselves as who they are not. Especially since the war in Iraq, Europeans describe themselves as being non-Americans.³³

More than anything else, foreign policies are what differentiate the Allies. A Times-Mirror Center survey concluded that every three in four Western European countries pointed foreign policies as the source of friction, not values.³⁴ It was in particular the case with the Bush Administration. Pulling out of the Kyoto Treaty and refusing to sign the Nuclear Test ban Treaty are only two examples of unilateral policies. Isolating the Guantanamo Bay prisoners away from the mainland not to have to treat them as prisoners of war, in accordance with the Geneva Convention and applying tariffs on imports from other countries, like the European steal

industry, are two other examples of policies that tend to separate more than unite the Allies.³⁵ Americans are quicker to the use of force to solve problems than Europeans are. According to consistent surveys performed by the German Marshall Fund, 80% of Americans agreed that under certain conditions war is necessary to obtain justice, while less than a third of French, Germans, Italians or Spanish would agree with it.³⁶ Americans also appear more comfortable with the idea of military preemption.³⁷ The war in Iraq is a clear example. While some Western European governments supported the war, the public in general was against it.³⁸ The foreign policy against terrorism also splits the Allies. Europeans have a large experience dealing with terrorism in its own territory. England, Ireland and Spain together, had more than 5,000 deaths, due to terrorist acts in the last 30 years.³⁹ It only became more noticeable after 9/11 and with the bomb attacks in Madrid on March 11, 2004, and in London on July 7, 2005.

Differences in interests, perceptions, experiences, or mere policies are often accompanied by splitting words on both sides of the Atlantic and do not bring anything positive to the Transatlantic Alliance. Using ideology and religious references such as “you’re either with us or against us” and “axis of evil” is appealing and hardly accepted by some Europeans, where the memory of oppressive regimes full of messianic promises is still fresh.⁴⁰ In the mist of a post Cold War and post 9/11 international order, the Allies seem to be drifting apart. This growing split in the West becomes quite concerning in a time where the rising of global threats seem to threaten the normality of the western societies. Whether it is a wrong perception or a cruel reality, this global insecurity environment seems to affect what best defines the West – its Values.

Global Insecurity

1. The effects of American Hegemony

Because of its military, economic and political power, America is in fact a world hegemonic Nation. For those who scarcely recognize this reality there are studies made since 1880, in twenty-year intervals, that ranked the countries until present days. They are based on numerous factors such as economic strength, population and percentage of GDP spent in the military. In these, America appears in all top five positions. Additionally, in the last years the gap between America and any other competitor increased considerably.⁴¹ There are other important and emerging powers in the world such as Europe, China, Japan, Russia and India - just to name a few - but they simply cannot match the American might. Europe is economically very strong, although the lack of strategic unity among EU members prevents Europe from blooming and becoming a stronger global political player. As long as Europe is absorbed by its own problems and its own agenda - the EU enlargement, the stability and growth pact, the social budget pressure driven by an aging population and immigration – European military and political power will take time to grow and compete with America.

The American military is so strong that any other country cannot challenge it directly. “The fact that America possesses peerless global political clout makes it the focus of envy, resentment, and, for some, intense hatred.”⁴² Hegemony creates new possibilities and opportunities, although, just as Zbigniew Brzezinski argues in his book, “*The Choice*,”⁴³ it also brings new responsibilities, threats and challenges. Those who cannot challenge America directly are seeking other disruptive ways, trying to hurt the world leader.

2. The effects of Globalization, Economic Asymmetry and Political awareness.

Geographical isolation, the end of the Cold War, the victory over communism, a technology driven revolution in military affairs, the chance of spreading a model of society through the internet and modern communication systems, all served to emphasize the level of American's hegemony. With Globalization, the world seemed to shrink considerably. It became accessible from a distance of a click. Products became accessible from anywhere at anytime. As the world seemed to shrink and be more within reach of a finger, the risks of one being able to influence another's life grew at the same rate. The revolution of new technologies accelerated the globalization process. Globalization compressed time and distance in favor of the more developed countries. Globalization promoted the economic abyss between North and South, between developed and undeveloped countries. The information era that accompanied Globalization allowed a general increasing awareness or political consciousness among different civilizations. It allowed the world to perceive the American hegemony but it also allowed the building of resentment against Americans.⁴⁴

This political awareness of all the differences between the West and other regions of the globe grows the roots that nationalists, ethnic or religious fundamentalists need to recruit among those in need.⁴⁵ Brzezinski affirms that the world is now politically awakened to the inequality in the human condition.⁴⁶ Globalization – due to the American superior capacity to project itself in the world – gained an American face. Americans to the eyes of extremists soon became responsible for all the problems everywhere in the world. America became the reason extremists needed to feed their cause.

If modern technology allowed more power, and allowed America to reach further and faster, it also virtually eliminated the geographical isolation and in some cases became a source of threat to Americans. When Brzezinski affirms technology is the great equalizer of societal

vulnerability, he is referring to the endless possibilities the new technologies bring to those intended to do evil.⁴⁷ He is referring to the increased access to critical information thru the World Wide Web as well as to destructive means, kinetic or non-kinetic that those not adherent to law and respect for the human life - terrorist organizations, organized crime, ideological or religious extremist - can induce in modern day societies. After the end of the Cold War, the number of security concerns with global influence became enormous.

3. The New Challenges and Threats to Global Security

The problems the world faces today are not only terrorism, organized crime, weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts or state failure: it is more complex than that. It represents a complicated net of problems that creates a multiplying effect that flames the world security and peace. This flaming effect is considered as global turmoil.⁴⁸ It derives from a compound of problems, such as persistent mass poverty, social injustice, ethnic oppression, or religious fundamentalism. Problems like these, very often become connected with each other forming a complex and dangerous web. In an extreme or apocalyptic view, it is a matter of time before a group, an organization or a state is able to inflict a true technological advanced act of terrorism with unknown consequences.⁴⁹

Poverty paralyzes some regions in the world and creates the social conditions fundamentalists need to recruit terrorists, just like in Iraq. In places like South Asia, as much as 85% of the populace live with less than \$2 per day.⁵⁰ Close to 3 billion people, almost half of the world's entire population is affected by poverty, living on less than \$2 a day and every year 45 million of those die due to hunger and poor nutrition.⁵¹ Poverty often relates with lack of education, illiteracy and lack of justice, factors that empower terrorist recruiters. Poverty tends

to promote the will of mass migration. It feeds ethnic hatred and the fight for survival, just like in Darfur, for example.

Ethnic conflicts, such as the ones responsible for the conflicts in the Balkans in the 90s, continue to foster and create regional instability. There are about 25 million Kurds between Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria seeking the recognition of the state of Kurdistan. There are at least 8 million people in Kashmir trying to survive under Pakistan and India's pressure. The Chechens are trying to survive Russia's slow genocide. 4.5 million Palestinian Arabs are trying to survive the 5 million Israelis.⁵² These are just some examples of regional conflicts based on ethnicity that can ignite instability in a specific region or have a multiplying turmoil effect. Regional conflicts normally persist in time, are violent, destroy human lives and they pass from generation to generation. They often lead to extremism, terrorism and state failure, constituting a direct threat to fundamental freedoms and rights.⁵³ Diseases like malaria or AIDS, consume states' human and economical resources, creating more poverty, unemployment and instability. Failing states become a threat to neighboring States and a safe haven for breeding of terrorist groups and organized crime. The conflict over natural resources such as oil, gas and water tend to persist. Water, essential for survival, is becoming scarce in some regions of the globe, like Africa and the Middle East and is perceived as a possible cause of regional conflicts.

Demographic pressures from the overpopulated poor regions may also transform illegal immigration into more violent migrations.⁵⁴ Side by side with mass migration is demographic congestion. Together the population in India, Pakistan, China, and Bangladesh will increase 1.05 Billion by 2050. Such a factor alone raises the need for more resources, creating social pressure, poverty, unemployment and instability. All these problems tend to breed ideological extremism, whether it is religious or political and gives way to terrorism.

The most noticeable of all the threats is terrorism. It has different forms and ways of manifesting itself. It does so through terror and violence, like 9/11 in New York, Madrid, London and endless times in the streets of Bagdad. The direct effect can be the killing of thousands of people. The indirect effects can be much worse. Terrorism can disrupt the normality of a society or institution. It can affect governments to the point that they react hotheaded and not in the best way. The world changed after 9/11, not because of the direct result of the terrorist attacks but because the shock wave they created in the Allies politics, relationships and trust. Terrorism aims to influence, to capture politically a particular government.⁵⁵ When terrorist groups become associated with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the stakes of danger become higher. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is by far the worst of all threats. The advance of technology and biological sciences increases the element of risk to modern societies.⁵⁶ Several threats contribute to this one, which might have the worst results of them all. Briefly, the use of WMDs might be the result of terrorism committed to extreme violence.⁵⁷ Their availability might result from organized crime and their production might happen under the auspices of a failing state. The possibility of the combination of several of the previous factors is quite overwhelming and disturbing.

In contrast with the Cold War period, some of these threats are hardly visible and recognizable. To deal with them requires more than kinetic capacities. They defy the military logic and their implications to the western societies are unpredictable and are still to reveal. Their implications might vary from only some constraints in the life style, to a complete alteration of people's behaviors in order to protect self.

4. Implications for the West

The effect of globalization combined with new challenges, such as global terrorism, had a determinant impact in the international community, in the transatlantic relationship and in the concepts of security and defense. Different societies deal with terrorism in their own different way that among others derives from their grand politic, their history or their geography. American and European governments add a similar initial response to the 9/11 attacks. The invocation of NATO Article 5, for the first time in the Alliance's existence, only 24 hours after the terrorist attacks to the United States, was a clear signal that the North Atlantic Nations were individually and collectively bonded to whatever measures were to be taken against the terrorists.⁵⁸ Although unity of effort was the first reaction to the attacks, soon after, in the pre-Iraq War period, America and Europe started to drift apart, because of different identities, interests and experiences. Only two weeks after NATO evoked Article 5, White House Officials, stated that the mission should determine the coalition, setting the tone for what came to be the post 9/11 doctrine.⁵⁹ The difference in strategy was certainly the results of innumerable factors. What is relevant for this argument is that, the aftermath result of 9/11 was a growing split between Europe and America. If initially after 9/11 they were closer than ever, with time, the differences in strategy accentuated and they became further apart. In the American Administration traditional way to present the problem to its people, in 2002, several countries were defined as belonging to the "axis of evil."⁶⁰ Europeans see it more as a political manifestation and less as a materialization of evil that tends to be less rational and more emotional.⁶¹ What is relevant is that the effects of 9/11 unveiled differences between Europeans and Americans that were developing since the end of the Cold War. It also emphasized the doubts about the strategic importance of the Transatlantic Alliance. In a time when the threats are diffuse and hard to pin point and eliminate, a deep cooperation between institutions and states

is required, in order to overcome them. The dilemma is simple than, whether the nature of the threats is understood and nations cooperate among themselves to deal with them, or if they split apart they will become weaker and more vulnerable.

America now duels between seeking its own security alone, in a unilateral way, or thru multi cooperation. American history was developed under the idea that America was a holy place, a land of opportunity, with plenty of resources, protected by two oceans that always gave Americans a certain sense of sanctuary and purpose. That sense of sanctuary disappeared with the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The decision of fighting terrorism in a unilateral way proved to be economically and politically expensive, ineffective and with unpredictable results. Operation Iraqi Freedom is the undeniable example with a perplexing paradox. Militarily, America was never so strong, politically, was never so weak.⁶² America is in a crossroad, has a strategic choice of its own to make, whether to persist in an isolationist policy, and continues defending its own ideology and interests in a different way from the European ones, or it decides to share decisions inside the international institutions it helped create. The strategic solution that best defends the Allies, in the next century, is certainly the one that best preserves their core democratic values. The values that define what the West in reality is.

Possible Solutions to Preserve the West

The Allies need to find to a solution that best protects what the West represents, freedom, democracy and social prosperity. It cannot be based on immediate strategies, short-term political views, but on higher principles for a slow but positive impact on the future. It needs to serve the West's interests and ideologies. This chapter starts with the definition of the three criteria that will evaluate possible solutions: legitimacy, collective security and preservation of the western values. It then analyzes them in three different hypothesis: NATO replaced by ad hoc Coalitions, NATO replaced by a separate American and European military and NATO organized and prepared for the 21st Century.

1. Evaluating Criteria

The first criterion used to evaluate possible solutions is legitimacy. Legitimacy is something based on recognized principles or accepted rules and standards⁶³ and in accordance with the law or with established legal forms and requirements.⁶⁴ It is generally accepted as legitimate that “a mandate from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) upholds and reproduces the international legal system”⁶⁵ and “accords with a just cause, i.e., that the deliberation in the council reflects notions of justice and ethics.”⁶⁶ When an institution or government perceives for whatever reason, the necessity of using the military instrument of power, it first seeks the legitimacy that will give it not only the legal and political support for its actions, but also the public support. Because this support is important, states or institutions seek their actions to be viewed as legitimate, through diplomacy, via the UNSC or via a significant international support. In Kosovo, where human rights were at stake and could not wait for a

UNSC resolution, the West intervention was considered legitimate since it embraced significant international support. During the first Gulf War, in 1991, President Bush sought an approval from the UNSC even when under the UN Charter – Article 51 – it was not necessary, since Kuwait had requested assistance. For this discussion, what is important is that states or Institutions like NATO recognize as fundamental the legitimacy given by the UN from where they drive the legal, political, or public support.

The second selected evaluating criterion is collective security. States promote collective security when they commit themselves to develop and enforce rules accepted by the international community and when their actions are legitimized by representative international organizations. NATO, the Western European Union (WEU) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) are three examples of institutions that fulfill the collective security role. The North Atlantic community created NATO initially as a collective defense institution and after the end of the Cold War it developed the strategy and processes of a collective security institution.⁶⁷

The third evaluating criterion analyzes which solution best defends the preservation of western values as described in Chapter 1. These values can be found in the Declaration of Independence of the United States Constitution,⁶⁸ in the Treaty on the European Union,⁶⁹ or in the first chapter of the UN Charter.⁷⁰

2. NATO Replaced by Ad Hoc Coalitions

The war in Iraq presented the World with a crisis action formula based on a “coalition of the willing,” an ad hoc coalition that replaced the pluralism of an organization like NATO. After the 9/11 attacks, while Europeans saw an opportunity for NATO to serve as a sign of unity and strength, Americans saw it as an obstacle for an effective response. For Americans, the military clumsiness of the NATO members during the Balkans conflicts was still fresh in their memory.

If NATO was not able to support or defend American interests in the Middle East, then why should it exist at all? For some American Officials it was time for a different arrangement in the Euro-American security relations. This became evident in the Donald Rumsfeld formulation, “the mission should determine the coalition.”⁷¹ If the North Atlantic Coalition was not up to the moment, then another coalition would do it.

The Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF) are two distinct case studies that reflect an Alliance based operation and an ad hoc coalition operation. The international community fully supported OEF, which constitutes an example of a legitimate answer to a common enemy. When the war in Afghanistan started, the large majority of Europeans, people and governments, were in support of the war against Al Qaeda and the Taliban regime,⁷² precisely because the situation was clear and presented no doubts. OIF, the example of an ad hoc coalition, represents a different scenario. The war in Iraq started in an international political turmoil. On March 2003, while 70% of Americans were in support of President Bush’s decision to go after the Iraqi regime, as many Europeans were against that decision.⁷³ Europeans did not see the war as the only way to deal with the Iraqi regime. While OEF had an acquaintance effect, bringing the international society together around Americans, OIF had the exact opposite one. Ad hoc coalitions do not rely on institutionalism since their purpose is to overcome the diplomatic or institutional drag. They do not have the set up of a legitimate institution since they do not rely on the agreement of an international majority of countries represented by recognized institutions. Ad hoc coalitions are contrary to the principle of collective security since they do not assure that states commit themselves to develop and enforce rules generally accepted by the international community. Tactical and specific goals, more than ideology, drive ad hoc coalitions. They are based on opportunities created by specific

interests and interpretation of security problems. They are not organized around lasting common values.⁷⁴ The Iraqi war did not result from a general perception of eminent threat to the international peace, or from an absolute necessity of prevention of such danger. It resulted from a unilateral driven process without clear end states and objectives.

3. NATO Replaced by a separate American and European Military

Just as the embryonic European Coal and Steel Community of 1951 in Paris became a mature consolidated economic and social European reality, so will the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) become an inevitable reality. Since there is no longer a Cold War, there is apparently no reason for Europe and America not to have their own separate and independent defense institutions. Some believe it is time for Europeans to assume their own defense responsibilities and free America of that expensive burden. Security has been a top priority for America over the past decades. Europeans, accustomed to having the American protection, seem to live in what Robert Kagan designates a “paradise.”⁷⁵ A safe place protected by the powerful America that gives Europe time and an economical buffer to deal with her own institutional problems. Others believe that with such a vast economy, representing a third of the world GDP, the EU is inevitably a global player.⁷⁶ Politically speaking though, the EU is not yet in full bloom. The natural path of such an economical colossus is to become also politically relevant and assume its responsibility in global security and in defending its values and beliefs. It is true that the European project has been a slow process, but it also true that it has come a long way. When questioned about the EU, fifty years into the future, the majority of the Europeans see it as having an important role in diplomacy with its own military and an elected president.⁷⁷ In order for that to happen and to see its political capacity match its economical one, Europe needs to consolidate its security and defense policy. The relevant question is whether the ESDP will

serve the transatlantic link or if it will have an antagonistic effect, increasing the breach between Americans and Europeans.

With the eruption of the Balkans conflicts in the 1990s, where more than 200,000 people died in Bosnia and Herzegovina alone and millions fled their homes to escape atrocities not seen since WWII, Europe awoke for the necessity of creation of mechanisms to prevent future crisis.⁷⁸ In the advent of the world's geopolitical turmoil succeeding 1989, the Maastricht Treaty, (Treaty on the EU), established in 1993, laid down the legal basis for a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and the progressive framing towards a common defense policy (ESDP).⁷⁹ "The Monetary Union, CFSP and ESDP, and most obviously eastward expansion are unimaginable without this macro-political change of environment."⁸⁰ So far, the ESDP core missions have been humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and crisis management. Since 2003, the ESDP went to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Indonesia, Iraq and Georgia.⁸¹ It got involved in 11 different operations, including military and police missions, rule of law and civilian-military support missions. With the western disarrangement provoked by the war in Iraq, Europe seems even more determined to fully develop its own military structure and rule its own future. The purpose is not to transform the Union into a military alliance, but to equip it with the necessary instruments to become internationally credible and become able to defend the ideas and values it proclaims.⁸² No substantial results were met so far. The distance between rhetoric and reality among the European members is significant.⁸³ The EU has significant problems of its own, due to an economically demanding social welfare system. With an ever-increasing elderly population, the tendency is for the welfare system to become even more expensive⁸⁴ and the defense budget to become smaller. The enlargement process encompasses new economical

challenges that take precedence over the ESDP. With the possibility of ESDP becoming a reality, it needs to be confronted with the evaluating criteria. ESDP, just as NATO, is set to be a legitimate security tool. It belongs to the EU where liberal democracy, institutionalism and pluralism are a benchmark. So far, the missions where the EU intervened were in accordance with the UNSC. One must not forget that in this hypothesis, ESDP and the American Department of Defense would be operating separately. In a situation with conflicting interests, some countries would side with Europeans, others with Americans. The result would be a conflict of interests. The ESDP could fit the frame of a collective security institution, but because of its limited operational capacity, it is not ready to assume that role yet. Using NATO's example with almost 60 years of existence and only a few organic assets, such as the AWACS and the Air Operations Centers (AOC's), it is foreseeable that the ESDP will not have its own forces or structures anywhere soon. This means that the European capacity to execute any major operation in the world, for the sake of collective security is for the moment highly unlikely.

In a first analysis, ESDP fulfills the role of preserving the western values, although the reality might be quite different. Because it is a separate institution from the transatlantic alliance, it might become conflicting with the American interests and more than a bridging tool it might work as a dividing one. Several American officials point to the fact that Europe does not do enough to share the international security burden, while others have concerns about an independent European security capacity. On the European side, the concerns are identical. "ESDP adds nothing to military capabilities. It should be seen for what it is -- part of the process of European political integration, intruding into the most sensitive areas of national sovereignty, undermining NATO and widening the gap between the U.S. and Europe."⁸⁵ For many, Europe continues to be strategic for American interests. If Europe would become self sufficient in

defense, then the American forces in Europe would have to retreat from Europe. Withdrawing forces from Europe would signify an entrenchment in the world influence, a bad example to other regions in the world, something America is not prepared to do yet.

More concerning is the fact that an ESDP separated from NATO would mean that the forum of decision that NATO provides would no longer be available to filter interests and protect higher values. A split in the West is something desired by terrorists. It would mean less unity to fight a common threat and address the global turmoil issues.

4. The 21st Century NATO

NATO is a well-organized, mature institution that has been able to survive different challenges since 1949 and has defended what the west holds as most precious – freedom. In a world that is in continuous change, NATO reacts and tries to adapt. Between the American hegemony and the European military self-determination, NATO seeks to remain relevant. As today's challenges change in an era of information and globalization, NATO searches for a new strategic concept trying to remain as relevant as during the Cold War. As the Allies, separated by more than the Atlantic Ocean, grow different from one another due to their history, geography, interests or identities, it is required to evaluate if NATO remains a collective security institution and if it remains a legitimate Institution. At the end, it is even more important to understand what the West needs to do with NATO in this 21st century, to keep it as a tool to preserve the western values.

NATO is a collective security, political and military organization of 26 members. States that share democracy, freedom, rule of law, solidarity, individual liberty, well being, peace, stability and common heritage as core values.⁸⁶ Through Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, NATO initially established the principle of collective defense, meaning that an armed attack

against one or more members was an attack against all of them. In Reykjavik, May 2002, NATO members' foreign ministers decided that it would operate when and where required to fight terrorism. They decided that NATO would have no more geographic limitations.⁸⁷ NATO evolved to a broad definition of security, reaching not only to the military aspects of security but also to the political, economic, social and environmental ones.⁸⁸ It is viewed as a unique collective security partnership and forum for strategic security discussion, maintaining the link between North America and Europe.

Since its beginning, NATO derives its legitimacy from all its members and from its connection to the UN Charter. NATO's adaptation to the post Cold War and post 9/11 challenges, also called transformation, is well under way. A series of adaptations and adjustments took place between 1991, when NATO first published its strategic concept and the Riga Summit in 2006, when NATO presented its framework for the next 10 to 15 years. In addition, since its creation in April 1949, NATO has had five enlargements. From twelve founding members, NATO grew to 26. It might continue to grow as Albania, Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia aspire to become the next partner countries.⁸⁹ Georgia and Ukraine are also performing important reforms looking for an opportunity to become NATO members.⁹⁰ If NATO has evolved and adapted to such an unpredictable world in such a coherent manner, then why are there so many doubts about its relevance? What needs to be done to prepare NATO for the 21st century challenges? The answer to this question explains why NATO is an Alliance of values and why an Alliance created almost 60 years ago is more relevant today than it was back then. It also defines what kind of NATO is best fit to address the global challenges.

Today's threats can only be addressed with a marriage of convenience between what seems to be a pluralist Europe and a unilateral America.⁹¹ The western Leaders must understand the nature of today's threats and the context they emerge from, as presented in chapter two. They need to foresee the consequences if these challenges are not addressed in a unified political manner. As the Iraqi war demonstrates, American power is quite significant but even though might not be able to do everything on its own. Terrorism driven from fundamentalism requires international cooperation to achieve information superiority, requires addressing the true economic reasons underneath the problem and a diplomatic commitment driven from an international political community. Any attempt to address such a vast problem needs a broad and strategic consensus regarding a long-term solution and not a unilateral, short-term one. The Allies must perceive that the threat is not local or regional but global. The response needs to be determined, gradual, and global. Since it is a global threat, NATO needs to go global too.

A global NATO is the result of global cooperation between states that share common values and it is the solution to control global turmoil. America and Europe, representing almost 1 billion people, constitute the nucleus in this global cooperation or global community of shared interests. "A global community of shared interests, on the other hand, is not only possible and desirable but actually emerging."⁹² It is the spontaneous result of the advance of globalization and democracy and represents the natural evolution of interstate relations towards an informal global community of shared values.⁹³ NATO's ongoing cooperation with Australia, Japan, New Zealand and the Republic of South Korea, is an example of an expanding global community of shared interests.⁹⁴

The western Leaders must understand the European Union project is moving towards its own military and defense capacity and that it is inevitable for the sake of Europe's own internal

security and stability. The European defense pillar will mirror the political process and will take a long time, but eventually will be a reality. Instead of fighting against an autonomous ESDP, both Americans and Europeans need to accept it and use it in the global NATO concept. Because the Allies have different strengths, due to their different geography, history, nationalism/ethnicity, development, religion and interests, their particular capacities need to be correctly used. Europeans seem more experienced in nation building and peacekeeping missions. Due to their colonial experience in Africa, Europeans seem to be more suited to operate there. Americans, with a much more developed, technological advanced and capable military power, are more qualified to deter threats, prevent or terminate conflicts, when and where necessary.

A perfect political synchronized NATO might seem a utopian idea. History had the opportunity to show that Woodrow Wilson's vision of creating the League of Nations was not utopian. Had the Americans adhere to it and the Europeans been strong enough to believe in it, the world would probably be a safer place today. It is a matter of choice for both Americans and Europeans. Are Americans willing to give up some of their hegemony towards a truly global collective security? Are Europeans willing to alter their Stability and Growth Pact and give up some of their economical prominence in order to defend collectively the western values? It is a matter of choice between a true political commitment and a political and ideological isolation.

Significant changes need to occur in NATO's commanding framework in order to accommodate a more independent Europe and an America willing to share part of its NATO institutional control with the European members. In today's NATO, Europe is more an appendage rather than a European pillar.⁹⁵ America controls NATO and still has a large degree of freedom of action outside the Alliance.⁹⁶ In the 21st century NATO, Europe needs to assume

its full political and economic responsibilities and America needs to compromise its freedom of action towards effective institutionalism, in favor of global leadership rather than global governance. The world needs an America and a Europe truly interdependent with their security irrevocably linked, operating in cooperation with other democratic nations, when and where the global security requires.

“A strategic tipping point is at hand and for all its many contradictions NATO, as the West’s only truly strategic organization, remains the West’s best hope for generating strategic effect in the 21st century.”⁹⁷

Conclusion

As this paper presented, NATO is the indispensable Alliance to the preservation of the western values. It is a tool capable of uniting American and European interests and identities and without it, the West will grow weaker in today's global turmoil.

The first chapter described Americans and Europeans values and beliefs. It showed that Americans and Europeans are somehow different, although their cultural foundations are based on the same core democratic values and beliefs. Due to their different geography, history, nationalism/ethnicity, development and religion, they came to develop different external behaviors. Americans believe in exceptionalism and religious predestination. They still seek to “champion aspirations for human dignity,”⁹⁸ or defend the world from evil, guarantee “economic growth through free markets and free trade.”⁹⁹ Yet, because history did not give America a chance of learning a different way of defending these beliefs, as it gave to Europe, American foreign policies often collide with other nations, institutions and/or ideologies. Europeans, motivated by their history of war and violence moved from power politics to institutionalism and multilateralism. As chapter one demonstrated, more than values, policies is what most divides the West. This is especially noticeable in the way their leaders pursue their different strategies for the same problems.

The second chapter presented the security dilemma the world is facing today, which is the result of not only new threats and challenges but also the result of splitting western strategies. The chapter started with a reference to the American hegemony. Globalization, the victory over communism, a technology driven revolution in military affairs, the chance of spreading a model of society thru the internet and modern communication systems, all served to emphasize the level

of America's hegemony. It also allowed the rise of political awareness, envy and resentment against the West. With this political awareness, of all the differences between the West and other regions of the globe, grows the roots that nationalists, ethnic or religious fundamentalists need to foster their causes. The global turmoil the world faces today, comes from a complicated net of problems that feed one another and creates an exponential effect. It is a compound of problems, such as persistent mass poverty, social injustice, ethnic oppression, religious fundamentalism, terrorism, and organized crime, weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts or state failure. As chapter two demonstrates, the global turmoil and the end of total security, the possibility of weapons of mass destruction being used with catastrophic consequences, all have implications to the West that are twofold. First, they may have a direct influence on the western societies, inducing changes that go from small adjustments to complete alteration of people's habits. Secondly, they may have an indirect influence on the West, by creating divergences between the Allies policies, creating tensions and divisions that lead to a lack of unity.

The third and last chapter evaluated three different solutions to solve the security dilemma and defend the preservation of the western values. It used legitimacy, collective defense and preservation of the western values as evaluating factors. At the end, it advanced with some conclusions and recommendations for the West to be prepared for the 21st Century. The first evaluated solution was the creation of ad hoc coalitions, every time a security problem appears. Such solutions are not legitimate since they do not rely on international recognized and generally accepted institutions, such as the UNSC. It proved not to be the best way of defending collective security since Nations do not commit themselves to develop and enforce rules generally accepted by the international community. It also proved not to be the best way to preserve the western values, just as it happened during OIF, leaving the Allies in a weaker

political position. The second solution evaluated was NATO being replaced by a completely separate European and American Military defense structure. A complete separation between western military institutions, more than serving the West would hurt the preservation of its values. This solution also proved neither to be legitimate nor to defend collective security. An ESDP separated from NATO would mean that the forum of decision that NATO provides would no longer be available to filter interests and protect higher values. It would mean less unity to fight a common threat and address the global turmoil issues.

At the end, this chapter concludes and recommends what the West needs to do in order to prepare NATO for the 21st century and guarantee the preservation of the western values. It establishes that in order to face today's threats, a marriage of convenience, is required, between what seems to be a multilateral Europe and a unilateralist America. In the 21st century NATO, Europe needs to assume its full political and economic responsibilities and America needs to compromise its freedom of action towards effective institutionalism, in favor of global leadership rather than global governance. Only combining efforts first can the West address global insecurity. Then, since the threat became global, NATO needs to become global too. A global NATO would be the result of global cooperation between states that share common values and would be a proper solution to control the global turmoil.

“NATO embodies the transatlantic link by which the security of North America is permanently tied to the security of Europe. It is the practical expression of effective collective effort among its members in support of their common security interests.”¹⁰⁰

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